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Recent reviews of water and irrigation policies in six Mekong countries
have shown that ready-made ‘blueprint’ approaches are fast becoming
the norm. These are based on so-called ‘modern’ and internationally
promoted ‘best practices’. Yet all too often they fail to deliver.
Why? Because these top-down approaches ignore local systems and
hinder the natural evolution of a locally appropriate mix of community,
state and private management. To succeed, policies need to be tailored
to political, economic, social and cultural realities on the ground.
Mekong River, VietnamThis Water Policy Briefing is based on research presented in Irrigation and Water Policies in the Mekong Region: Current Discourses and
Practices (IWMI Research Report 95) by François Molle, and Evolution of Irrigation in South and Southeast Asia (Comprehensive
Assessment Research Report No. 5) by Randolph Barker and François Molle.
Water governance in the Mekong region:
the need for more informed policy-making
Recurring water crises, global water initiatives, and demands for water reforms by development banks, have
all pushed water up the agenda of most Mekong-region countries. Many changes have already been made.
Now decision makers need to know what has worked, what hasn’t, and why. To find out, IWMI has reviewed
new water policies, plans and laws, and assessed participation, the new water ‘apex bodies’, and integrated
water resources management (IWRM).
The findings show that top-down state policies based on ‘blueprints’ are widely applied in a one-size-fits-all
approach, without taking local realities into account. Water planning is still largely expert-driven, and focused
on procedures and targets. There is little room for decision-making that is based on negotiations between
users, line agencies, NGOs and politicians, for example. Although much mention is made of participation and
IWRM, little is being done on the ground.
To bridge these divides, better forms of governance are needed. And greater efforts need to be made to
understand complex local situations—so that policymakers are better informed, and new policies are
appropriate and workable. Key to this will be an understanding of what causes new policies to succeed or fail
in different contexts.
National water policies in the Mekong region bear many
common features. This is partly because water-related
problems are similar. But, it is also because the region’s
policies have been guided by mainstream thinking, as well
as by measures prescribed by development agencies and
banks as a condition for funding. As a result, national water
policies now include various ‘best practices’ (Box 1), which
are neither good nor bad in themselves. But whether they
were actually needed, and how they were applied, has had a
crucial effect on the success of water reforms in the region.
A good example of a ‘blueprint’ application of these
principles is a draft water law in Cambodia, which
involves a system of water-use licenses, water-resource
monitoring, and fees. Yet in reality such a complicated
‘solution’ isn’t really needed, as levels of water
abstraction are very low in the country, allocation
conflicts are hardly an issue, and hydrological
measurements are almost nil.
It’s also clear that the principles of stakeholder
participation and consultation—emphasized in many
policies—still aren’t being translated into concrete
actions. In fact, many large-scale projects that are likely
to have a great impact on a huge number of people are
still being designed with little public scrutiny—or even
in secret. Thailand’s planned water-grid project, which
could involve water transfers on a massive scale, is a prime
example. It also has to be recognized that governments
often fail to assess the benefits of proposed projects in
relation to their cost, and that they certainly don’t present
such cost–benefit analyses to the public as information
or for discussion.
Other concepts that involve consensus among
stakeholders, such as IWRM, are also being embraced on
paper. But in reality, they are not really having much effect.
Worse, they are sometimes being used as a smokescreen to
allow business-as-usual strategies to hold sway. For example,
the consultants who drew up one river-management plan in
Box 1. Common principles behind water
reforms in the Mekong region
• Improve water distribution in irrigation schemes—
through greater user participation and service
agreements
• Recover costs—through water charges
• Promote IWRM—e.g. by setting up river-basin
organizations or other links between users and line
agencies
• Control water use—through permits and rights
• Improve overall co-ordination—by setting up three tiers
of management bodies, e.g. (1) operators such as
irrigation providers and water-supply utilities, (2) resource
managers and regulators, (3) an apex body which sets
policies and standards
1 November,  2006Thailand touted it as ‘IWRM’, even though the approach
used by the project was hardly more ‘integrated’ than those
used in the past.
Another issue is that reforms that could really help people
and improve water management are never actually
implemented in full, even though they have been set out in
national law. This is because further decrees often have to
be passed before reforms can be put into action (as is the
case in China and Vietnam); this can lead to reforms being
watered down.
In addition, multi-lateral banks frequently attach
conditions to loans, which involve countries making reforms
to their water sectors. In practice, however, governments
often only set up small-scale pilot projects to fulfill these
conditions—mainly because there is little support for them
from the bureaucracy (as has occurred in Thailand).
Moreover, both pilot projects and entire systems of reform
may be abandoned when governments or policies change
(again, something which has happened in Thailand).
For future policies to be more effective, it will be
important to question the value of ‘off-the-shelf’ generic
reforms, to consider local realities, and to allow a fair process
of negotiation among stakeholders.
Water and irrigation policies: what can be learned
from the Mekong region?
Current planning priorities
Water-resource development differs sharply between
Mekong-region countries. Thailand, China and Vietnam
have already developed their irrigation systems extensively
(Table 1). By contrast, Laos, Cambodia, and to some extent
Myanmar, are still in the early stages of developing their
infrastructure. As a result, options for the future are still
being debated—sometimes fiercely, as in the case of the
dams planned for the Salween river basin shared by
Myanmar and Thailand.
Developing hydropower is a major plan in Vietnam, Laos
and China (in the upper Mekong). Cambodia, Laos and
Vietnam are also focusing on the rehabilitation of old
irrigation schemes and the building of new ones. Both Laos’
and Cambodia’s plans will depend heavily on funding from
international banks and donors.
China’s new policies now focus less on engineering, and
moves are afoot to include ‘modern’ concepts such as
environmental sustainability, demand management, rational
pricing, and institutional power-sharing.
Highly ambitious (or perhaps over-ambitious) targets for
expanding irrigation are a characteristic of some Mekong
countries’ policies. Laos plans to have 80% of its farmland
under irrigation by 2020. Furthermore, Thailand has touted
a trebling of the irrigated area in 20 years as part of its
gigantic ‘water grid’ plan.
The water-grid project exemplifies many common
governance trends in the region. Although the scheme would
have dramatic impacts on large numbers of people, their
livelihoods and the environment, no mention of participatory
processes has yet been made. In fact, the whole planning
process is shrouded in secrecy, with only a few contradictory
statements being released to the media. According to these,
the scheme’s projected cost varies between US$5 billion and
US$10 billion.
The plan is also a classic example of how large-scale
investments in the region are justified (1) by repeatedly
stressing the impacts of water shortages and floods, and (2)
by taking into account only a project’s benefits—while
disregarding costs. The focus on benefits rather than on cost–
benefit ratios is nicely summed up by a quote from a high-
ranking Thai official, who saw the water grid project as “a
worthwhile investment because it will benefit 30 to 40 million
people nationwide”1.
1The Nation newspaper, 23/06/03.
Table 1. Growth in irrigated area in selected Mekong countries, 1962-1998
Country Irrigated area, Average Area irrigated
1998 (’000 ha) annual growth, as a % of area
1962-1998 (%) harvested, 1998
Thailand 4,836 5.1 30
Vietnam 2,767 4.9 25
Myanmar 1,663 4.7 15
Cambodia 270 8.9 12
Laos 167 34.8 19
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benefit analyses and environmental impact assessments
are rarely undertaken. Yet ignoring cost–benefit ratios
for new irrigation schemes is perilous, as generally
construction costs are rising and benefits are falling (Fig.
1). Without balancing all costs and benefits and
comparing projects with alternative investments, the
decision to undertake new schemes may be driven by
the banks’ willingness to lend money, by national
politicians’ desire to develop new projects that will win
votes, or by bureaucracies seeking to perpetuate
themselves. As a result, planning often involves little
scrutiny of proposed projects and little accountability.
Water laws and policies
Although Thailand and Cambodia have drafted new
legislation, Myanmar still has to update its old water laws.
Vietnam, China and Laos, meanwhile, have already passed
new laws in recent years. Whether planned or already
passed, these laws often contain widely promoted ‘modern’
principles (Box 1), especially those drafted in Thailand.
One common thread that links all the Mekong
countries is that civil society has had no input into the
creation of their water laws.
Although laws and reforms have been passed, this
doesn’t necessarily mean they are applied. For example,
concerns have been raised about Laos’ capacity to put law-
based water rights into practice and its ability to monitor
and enforce them. This is despite the fact that water use
and allocation conflicts in Laos are still very limited.
Thailand’s water-sector reforms were driven mainly by
the conditions attached to an agricultural loan of US$600
million provided by two development banks. These
reforms were largely designed by bank consultants from
outside Thailand, and involved water price hikes which
were met with vehement opposition from farmers and
NGOs. The new Prime Minister phased out the reforms
in 2002 and 2003. This shows just how important it is to
assess how willing a country’s political leaders and
bureaucracy are to accept change—and how prepared
they are for it.
Pessimists argue that pressure from external agencies
to pass water acts leads to laws that are wholly inadequate,
at best innocuous, and at worst counter-productive.
Optimists, however, argue that the laws are a useful set of
principles that can be used to base future decisions and
policies on. Both viewpoints, however, underestimate the
state’s ability to control water systems and enforce laws.
Decision makers need to take a long hard look at whether
laws and reforms will actually achieve what they are
supposed to. They should also ask whether they clash with
or override traditional local norms, rights and rules that
are currently used.
Apex bodies and three-tier institutional design
The apex bodies (Box 1) set up in Thailand, Laos and
Vietnam aim to advise governments on water issues and
improve co-ordination between the various water-related
sectors and ministries. In Asia, they have been promoted as
‘best practice’ by the Asian Development Bank (ADB), as part
Figure 1. A typical scenario of irrigation investment in Asia: the real value of investments in the Philippines and
Sri Lanka, and the benefit–cost ratio in Sri Lanka, 1972-1999. Over time, the benefit–cost ratio fell as grain prices
crashed (partly because irrigation triggered higher yields) and building costs increased (as new sites less suitable
for irrigation were more costly to develop).
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reforms. They have been relatively well accepted, probably
because the different countries that have set them up realized
there was a great need to co-ordinate decision-making.
ADB sees apex bodies as bringing together “government,
civil society, and nongovernment stakeholders to promote
effective water policies and guide national water sector
reforms”2. Yet in reality, they are inter-ministry committees
that involve only government staff. And, as they are
committees, they don’t necessarily have the power or
resources needed to make effective changes to well-
established line agencies. Indeed, the achievements of all
three Mekong-region apex bodies have been rather modest
to date. However, it is early days yet, and with strong
leadership, political backing and legal legitimacy, they may
well have a greater impact.
In line with the three-tier structure, efforts have been
made to separate resource management and regulation from
water-supply operations by creating two lower tiers. However,
this has met with resistance from traditional line agencies.
Generally, they see it as a threat to their power, and little
progress has been made. Difficulties also arise because the
new water resource management departments set up in
Vietnam, Thailand and Cambodia are often staffed by
professionals transferred from the irrigation agencies. While
their competence and experience is useful, this sometimes
leads to them being seen as ‘spies’ by the resource-
management agency or ‘traitors’ by the irrigation agency.
This said, the separation of the three roles in water
affairs could have many benefits, but its effectiveness will
hinge on a substantial reshuffling of roles and
responsibilities. Laws may play an important role in
granting legitimacy to the new agencies, but their
effectiveness will have to come from high-level political
support, substantial funding, and support from staff with
vision and leadership.
Participation and turnover
Greater participation by local people in water
management does not seem to be a goal in China and
Vietnam. Their water laws make no mention of the concept,
because it is assumed that all citizens are represented by
their local administrative units and that people participate
through these channels.
In Laos, Thailand and Cambodia, however, various
attempts have been made to involve local farmers or water
user groups more in the management of the countries’
large-scale irrigation schemes. But the results of these
attempts, known as either participatory irrigation
management (PIM) or management transfer, have been
mixed. Shortcomings arise because farmers often don’t gain
real empowerment, new roles, or better control over their
water supply.  As has been seen in Thailand, farmers’ access
to water often doesn’t improve because they don’t have any
control over the way water is distributed and allocated at
higher levels in the system.
Laos’ new policies are said to include “fully
decentralized ‘bottom up’ participatory planning within
the governmental system”3. However, participation is
actually limited, even when formally organized, as was
the case for the Nam Theun II dam. The voice of civil
society is further restricted by the fact that Laos does not
allow the formation of national NGOs with any
independent social agenda.
Cambodia’s draft water law also enshrines the principle
of participation. However, in reality, efforts by the state have
so far mainly consisted of a process to turn over smaller
irrigation systems to farmer water user committees
(FWUCs) in 22 pilot projects. Even this is still very much a
top-down initiative, in which government experts tell
FWUCs what to do. In fact, the main aims are cost-sharing
and making farmers responsible for operations and
maintenance. This is paralleled by several NGO-based
initiatives to test different forms of self-/co-management
of irrigation schemes. The concept of participation officially
embraced may have to be adapted to take into
consideration the strong sense of hierarchy which pervades
2Arriens, W.T. 2004. ADB’s water policy and the needs for national water sector apex bodies. Asian Development Bank. www.adb.org/Water/NWSAB/2004/
Arriens_Paper2.pdf
3Khamhung, A. 2001. Land and water investment in the Lao PDR. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization.
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life, and the association of communal work with forced
collective labor, for example.
Across the region, and despite much official mention of
participation, mindsets haven’t changed much. Farmers
often see PIM as a state scheme, especially when their
access to water has not improved. Likewise, irrigation
agency staff often don’t believe that farmers are capable of
running schemes themselves. Such perceptions will take
time to root out.
It is also important to realize that the number of pumps
and wells in Asia has boomed over the last 10-15 years,
especially in the Mekong delta in Vietnam (Fig. 2). Many
farmers now pump river- or ground-water, and depend less
on surface irrigation systems—so there is less incentive
for people to manage them collectively. Less participation
in irrigation associations or PIM schemes may jeopardize
their success, so decision makers must consider the local
context before introducing such schemes.
IWRM and river-basin management
IWRM and river-basin management are widely
promoted as ways of addressing upstream and downstream
issues as well as interactions between surface water and
groundwater, water quality and quantity, and water uses
and users. They form a special case, in which
decentralization and participation have to be balanced with
centralized co-ordination and legal support for new
measures. They feature prominently in the water laws of
all six Mekong-region countries, though Cambodia, Laos
and Myanmar are only applying the concepts in one pilot
basin per country.
China’s river-basin management involves collecting data,
and planning and co-ordinating management between
provinces. However, the process is centrally directed by the
water ministry and its provincial departments, and no other
stakeholders have a say in negotiations about water allocation
or development plans.
Vietnam set up three river basin organizations (RBOs)
in 2001, two of which were heavily supported by external
donors. RBOs aim to co-ordinate the actions of different
ministries, state agencies and administrative units as well
as advise the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural
Development. All are state-controlled. In the Mekong delta,
for example, standing members of the RBO are mainly staff
from central government agencies in Hanoi—1000 km
away—while its representatives from the local provinces
have no voting rights. However, this said, RBOs could help
to integrate the different water-management strategies
currently used by different provincial authorities.
Figure 2. Number of pumps in selected Asian countries. 1979-1999
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25 main basins, based on a thorough analysis of local
resources, water use and problems. Though the early pilot
RBOs suffered because farmers were grossly under-
represented, this has now been corrected. A further
positive step has been taken in three of the country’s
RBOs, as representatives from local villages have been
chosen for, or elected to, sub-basin committees. These
members also take part in decision-making at the sub-
district and basin levels.
However, Thailand also provides examples of
consultancy firms ‘marketing’ conventional infrastructure
projects as IWRM. These claimed to fully involve local
stakeholders, but actually measured ‘participation’ in
terms of the number of meetings held to determine local
issues such as people’s domestic supply needs. By contrast,
people are little consulted about the large-scale projects
that are being planned or developed. These are classic
examples of ‘business as usual’ being given a new IWRM
label to attract extra funds or increase support at home
and abroad.
It doesn’t cost anything to make abundant references
to IWRM in policies and laws; but in reality, IWRM
Box 2. More informed policy-making—
questions which research should be
used to answer
• What are the most pressing issues related to water,
irrigation practices, and policies, and where is action
needed most urgently?
• What government measures would be realistic and
successful, given the political–economic environment?
• What could be achieved by using bottom-up approaches
which create a sense of ownership and benefit local
people? What are their costs and limitations?
• What incentives can be designed to encourage the staff
of line agencies to adopt new ways of working?
• What can we learn from the way policies are
implemented on the ground? What scope is there to
enhance social learning, build trust, and favor
endogenous processes?
• What is the underlying structure of power and interests
within the bureaucracy, political parties, and other
stakeholders, and what bearing does this have on the
options available and possible outcomes?
• How can external development banks and agencies
better provide support to both government and civil
society?
• How can we analyze policy failures beyond the infamous
“lack of political will” explanation?
• What are the implications if the private sector and/or
communities take over some current government roles?
involves redistributing power, changing mindsets, and
capacity-building—all of which require considerable
time and effort.
One way forward might be to avoid applying IWRM to
all basins in a country irrespective of whether it is needed
or not. Instead, decision makers should consider focusing
efforts and resources on basins which have obvious local
competition and allocation problems.
Overall, this brief synthesis shows there is a clear
need for more informed policy-making on water
governance in the Mekong region. Well-targeted research
can help (Box 2).
The way forward?
Most people feel that the state should solve ‘problems’
by finding ‘fixes’—whether technical, legal, or institutional.
This mindset, which dominates policy processes, is a major
weakness. Whether a water issue is actually a ‘problem’
which needs to be ‘fixed’ depends on who you ask. Ideally,
therefore, an open process of policy-making is needed, in
which people with different perspectives (e.g. water users,
experts, and decision makers) toss ideas back and forth to
decide how to improve a situation.
This should involve a fair process of negotiation, which
takes into account and balances the interests, priorities, and
aspirations of each group of stakeholders. Forums which
bring together line agencies, politicians, business,
development agencies and banks, and civil-society groups
(e.g. water-user associations and NGOs) offer one way
forward.
Whatever the process, questioning the use of blanket,
generic reforms will be vital (Box 3).
Box 3. Critical questions that
policymakers must ask
• Will the benefits of change actually outweigh the costs?
• How will benefits and costs be distributed in society, and
what compensation will losers get?
• If laws are passed, can they be practically applied and
enforced?
• If an apex body or river-basin organization is created,
does it have the power, expertise, political support, and
funding needed to do its job?
• Are water abstraction rates so high and allocation
conflicts so common that IWRM approaches are needed?
• Will greater participation be possible given local culture
and politics?
• Are there sufficient administrative and political resources
to implement reforms effectively?
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